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THE CHICAGO WATER DIVERSION
By ERNEST BRUNCKEN*
T HE litigation growing out of the attempt of the city of Chi-
cago, its Sanitary District, and the State of Illinois, to divert
an unreasonably large amount of water from Lake Michigan into
the Mississippi, without regard to the injury done thereby, when-
ever the water level happens to be periodically low, to the naviga-
tion interests, the riparian owners, and even -the agricultural fertility
of the Great Lakes country and the people living in the surrounding
region would attract considerable attention simply by reason of the
magnitude of the interests involved. To the lawyer, the political
scientist, the sociologist and the statesman, however, they are of even
greater interest, not so much on account of the legal questions decided
-by the Supreme Court of the United States in the two cases adjudicated
by that tribunal, but rather by the questions more or less definitely
raised in the pleadings and arguments which were left undecided by
the Court and therefore constitute a sinister legacy that may possibly
come to plague future generations.
The facts in these cases, although voluminous in their statement,
are not very complicated; nor are the points of law decided of a
particularly novel or difficult character. A brief statement of the most
important facts will -show this to be the case.
In 1881, an Illinois statute authorized the City of Chicago to pump
water out of Lake Michigan, through the South Branch of the Chi-
cago River, into an old canal connecting the Lake with the Illinois
River. This canal was a project begun under two 'acts of Congress
passed in 1822 and 1828, giving a grant of public lands for that pur-
pose. The canal was completed in 1848, improved in 1872, but had
not become a very important channel of navigation. By the latter
year, both the Chicago River and the canal were become very much
polluted by the sewage allowed to flow into it. In 1883, the pumps
installed under the act mentioned above began adding a thousand cubic
feet of water a second, which at that time seemed to be sufficient to
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dilute and purify the sewage in the canal. In 1886, the highest level
of water known since 1835 was reached in the Lake, and a steady
moderate current of water flowed out of the Lake into the old canal
and on into the Illinois and Mississippi. Everybody was happy.
During the following years, however, the Lake level steadily re-
ceded, and by 1889 was two feet lower. It has oscillated somewhat
since then, but even with the high water of 1929 it has not yet reached
again the maximum of 1886. The pumps were able to pump little
more than 6oo second feet, and the pollution became worse than ever.
In 1891 the State Drainage and Water Supply Commission recom-
mended the building of a canal from the Chicago to the Desplaines
River, through the low height of land which divides the hydrographic
basin of the Great Lakes (or St. Lawrence) from that of the Missis-
sippi. This canal was to have a capacity of approximately 12,000
second feet, and be capable of carrying boats up to 2,000 tons burden.
It was to be both a great commercial highway and an inexpensive
method of disposing of the sewage. The fact that the comparatively
small amount of sewage flowing through the pumps had been puri-
fied satisfactorily before it reached the Illinois, as long as I,OOO second
feet of Lake Michigan was added, made everybody sanguine to hope
that a large amount, in a larger canal, would also be purified before
it got into the lower river.
In 1890, under an Illinois act of 1889, the Sanitary District was
organized. It has since been enlarged and now embraces the metropoli-
tan area, west of the Indiana line, with a total of 438 square miles,
containing fifty-four cities, villages, and country towns. This muni-
cipal organization, with ample taxing and borrowing powers, proceeded
to build the now famous Drainage Canal.
In 1896, the first permit in connection with this matter was granted
by the Secretary of War. It was for the enlargement of the cross sec-
tion of the Chicago River, but expressly guarded against any interpre-
tation that the government thereby authorized a current in the river
opposite to its natural flow. The application had -become necessary,
because Congress by the River and Harbor Act of 189o had prohibited
the changing of the channel of a navigable river without such a permit.
This law was amplified by sections 9 and io of the River and Harbor
Act of 1899. On December 5, 19oi, the Secretary of War granted
a permit to pump 4,167 -second feet (or 250,000 cubic feet a minute)
into the new drainage canal. Thereafter a number of similar permits
were granted, lowering or increasing the flow from time to time, for
various reasons. In 1907, an application for additional flow through
the Calumet Sag channel, to the south of the Chicago River, was
denied. The Sanitary District found some sort of excuse to prepare
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for taking the water anyhow; and the Government tried to prevent
this by an injunction. This injunction was appealed. The District
then began to exceed its limit of water through the regular drainage
canal, and was again enjoined. On appeal the two injunctions were
combined and constitute the record in the case of U. S. v. Sanitary
District."
In the meantime, the State of Illinois, by an amendment to its con-
stitution, had provided for a deepwater way from the Drainage Canal
at Lockport, to a point on the Illinois River at Utica, and thereby
created the navigation excuse for the Drainage Canal. The Sanitary
Distrct, at the place where a limestone ridge is crossed, near Lock-
port, established a power house, by which it is receiving consider-
able revenue, both from the City of Chicago and from private parties.
There is still another group of facts, which does not figure in the
cases decided by the Supreme Court but throws considerable light
on the character of the enterprise. The amount of sewage flowing
into the Drainage Canal from the rapidly growing population centers
of Chicago and its suburbs soon became so great that there was no
longer a thought of its oxydization, as had been the case at the begin-
ning. As a consequence, the entire Desplaines River below the canal,
and a portion of the Illinois, have become so polluted that all the fish
have died and the -banks can no longer be used for recreation purposes.
The polluted stretch is gradually lengthening and now is but a few
miles above Peoria. The hundreds of persons owning the land along
the banks of the two rivers were compelled to bring action, each for
himself, against the Sanitary District. Naturally, they are at a dis-
advantage, on account of the cost of litigation; and many of the plain-
tiffs have consented to accept trifling amounts in lieu of the sub-
stantial amounts they are justly entitled to for damages. The injuries
to the fisheries and to the beauty of the stream are lost without com-
pensation to the public.
The injunction suits, commenced in 19o8 and 1913, respectively,
although brought in the name of the United States, had a curious his-
tory. They were begun by the Attorney-General, by virtue of his im-
plied powers to protect the rights of the federal government, on two
principal grounds. The first was that the withdrawal of more than
250,000 cubic feet per minute would lower the level of the Lakes
below Lake Superior, and of the St. Lawrence River, by six inches,
and thereby alter and modify the navigable channels, which by the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, cited above, was prohibited and
made a misdemeanor. The second ground was that the Treaty with
1266 U.S. 405; 69 L.Ed. 352.
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Great Britain of January ii, i9o9, expressly prohibited any act affect-
ing the natural level or flow of boundary waters without the approval
of the Joint Commission provided for in that treaty. It was charged
that instead of the 250,000 cubic feet per minute the District had been
taking from 40o,000 to 6oo,ooo cubic feet, and in addition threatened
to construct a second canal through the Calumet Sag, necessarily adding
to the quantity of water diverted.
The District, in its answer, relied on the Act of Congress of March
30, 1828, cited above (3 St. at L. 659), the conditions of which were
never complied with; and the Act of March 2, 1827, authorizing a land
grant for the building of a canal to connect Lake Michigan with the
Illinois River. The defendant also maintained that it was obliged to
obey an Illinois statute, of May 29, i899, by which it was directed,
among other things, to maintain a continuous flow through the canal of
not less than 20,0oo cubic feet per minute for each ioo,ooo inhabitants
in the Sanitary District.
Evidence-much of which was directed towards the feasibility and
desirability of a Lake to Gulf canal and afterwards disregarded by the
Supreme Court as irrelevant-was received and the result taken under
advisement by ,the federal judge. This was the learned gentleman who
in 1922 resigned to accept the more congenial and lucrative duties of
"boss" of a commercialized sport. Two years before his resignation,
he had rendered an oral decision in favor of the government, after
taking six years to consider. Naturally, the defendants had no ob-
jection to the delay; but they made a motion for a rehearing, which
the court again took under advisement. After Judge Landis' resigna-
tion, another judge entered a decree for an injunction, with a stay of
six months for an appeal. In the Supreme Court, a number of states
bordering on the Mississippi were allowed to file briefs as amici curiae,
on the side of the Sanitary District. The attorneys for Michigan and
the Lake Carriers' Association addressed the Court orally in the same
capacity on behalf of the Government.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decree, and in doing so decided a
number of important questions, or at least reaffirmed certain important
doctrines.
Perhaps the most fundamental point made -by the Court was directed
to the argument of the defendant that the United States, by assenting,
through the Secretary of War, to the change in the condition of a body
of navigable water, had estopped itself from afterwards withdrawing
that assent. This proposition the court vigorously denied by asserting
that a "state cannot estop itself by grant or contract from the exercise
of the police power." Expressed more concretely, that means: No per-
son has a right to claim damages because the government today pro-
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hibits some act which yesterday it permitted. Still less can anybody
claim the right to continue a prohibited action, because at one time it
was not prohibited. When put in that form, it is easy to see that the
contrary doctrine would destroy the very foundations of government.
The law would have to remain forever what it had always been. Yet
there need be no doubt that the argument of the defendant was put
forward in good faith. The outward similarity between the permis-
sion of the government to divert the water, and the act of a private
landowner who permits me to put the foundations of my building
partly on his land and is estopped from afterwards driving me off, must
have blinded him. Yet, the Court shows the difference by the simple
statement that "this is not a controversy between equals. The United
States is asserting its sovereign power."
See the numerous cases cited in support of this doctrine. 2
However, the decree in the injunction cases interfered little with the
plans of the Sanitary District. It went to the Secretary of War for
permission to tap io,ooo second feet, the equivalent of 6oo,ooo cubic
feet per minute, which had always been its maximum demand, although
it has been claimed ,that at times even this was exceeded. The permit
actually issued allowed an annual average of 8,5oo second feet, on con-
dition that before expiration of the permit, on December 31, 1929,
proper sewage reduction plants should be built, enough to take care of
one-third of the population. It was also stipulated that the City of
Chicago should, within three years, install a system of metering its
water supply. The federal engineering department was to supervise
the execution of this permit.
It was clear that under these provisions the interests that were in-
jured by the extraordinary acts of .the Sanitary District, the City of
Chicago, and the State of Illinois had no sort of guarantee that the
tortious proceedings would not continue. The injunctions covered
only a part of the cause of action; and nobody could tell but what
some future Secretary of War might modify the permit so as to release
the Chicago people from the duty of taking the steps prescribed in
order to make the diversion unnecessary from the sanitary point of
view. While the appeal from the injunction decree was still pending,
the states of Wisconsin, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania brought
an original action in the Supreme Court of the United States against
the State of Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago; soon after,
similar suits were separately brought by the Stite of Michigan and
the State of New York against the same defendants, with the primary
purpose of determining that the rights of the people of these states to
Sanitary District v. U.S. 266 U.S. 405; 69 L.Ed. 353.
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free and unobstructed navigation on the Great Lakes were dependent,
not on the discretion of some executive officer like the Secretary of
War, but on the fundamental laws of this country. The states of
Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas
intervened as defendants, apparently because they had conceived the
notion, sedulously fostered .by Chicago propaganda, that somehow the
navigability of .the Mississippi was bound up with the diversion of water
from the Great Lakes.
The bills of the complainants substantially showed that the diversion
of water through the Drainage Canal had lowered the water of the
Lakes not less than six inches, thereby causing great injury in various
forms to the plaintiff states and their people; that none of the acts
complained of had been authorized by Congress; that the withdrawal
of water was for the purpose, not of promoting navigation or inter-
state commerce, but of sanitation, for which Congress could exercise
no power; that the acts complained of were not done for the purpose
of promoting navigation and interstate commerce; and that the diver-
flion was in conflict with the Act of Congress of March 3, 1899.
After a demurrer by the defendant state of Illinois and motions
to dismiss by the intervening states had .been over-ruled, the defendants
made their several answers. In them they pressed the point that the
diversion was for the improvement of navigation on the Illinois and
Mississippi Rivers; that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches in not bring-
ing their suits earlier, and were estopped because they had well known
for what purpose the Drainage Canal was being built, and had not
objected at that time; and that, if damage had been caused to anybody,
it was damnum absque injuria, having been caused by measures taken
by Congress, the executive of the United States, the State of Illinois,
and its subdivisions, in the legitimate endeavor to promote commerce
and navigation.
The Court appointed as special master to take evidence no less a per-
son than former Justice Charles Evans Hughes, thereby recognizing
the importance of the questions of fact involved in the matter.
The plaintiffs, in their briefs and arguments, raised a number of
questions of a profound constitutional nature but .the Court did not
decide these. It issued an interlocutory decree, based substantially on
these three propositions:
i. The various acts of Congress authorizing surveys and other
measures looking toward the construction of a "Lakes-to-Gulf" water-
way, and especially -the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927, which con-
tained an express proviso that nothing therein should authorize any
diversion from Lake Michigan, do not constitute an authorization by
Congress of any substantial diversion from the Lake.
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2. The primary purpose of the Drainage Canal and the diversion
is sanitation, not the promotion of commerce and navigation; but
Congress has no power to provide for 'the health of the inhabitants of
a state; that is within the constitutional authority of the local govern-
ment.
3. The Secretary of War, in issuing permits, acted for the purpose
of preventing unlawful interference with the navigability of the Great
Lakes. In doing so, he was within his authority, conferred by the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and other acts of Congress. These
acts do not in any sense constitute an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power; the Sanitary District had failed to do its duty of
providing for proper sewage disposal; therefore an emergency existed
which was recognized in the prior injunction suit 3 and in the tempor-
ary and conditional permit of March 3, 1925. So far, the Sanitary
District and the City of Chicago have complied with the conditions of
this permit.
The Court declares that on the basis of these propositions the plain-
tiffs "are entitled to a decree which will be effective in bringing that
violation of the complainants' rights, and the unwarranted part of the
diversion, i.e. the diversion not designed to promote navigation, to an
end. But in keeping with the principles on which courts of equity
condition their relief, and by way of avoiding any unnecessary hazard
to the health of the people of that section, our decree should be so
framed as to accord to the sanitary district a reasonably practicable
time within which to provide some other means of disposing of the
sewage, reducing the diversion as the artificial disposition of the sew-
age increases from time to time, until it is entirely disposed of thereby,
when there shall be a final, permanently operative, and effective injunc-
tion."
In accordance with this declaration, the case was again referred
to the master to take such evidence as may be needed to frame a fur-
ther decree on the basis of the principles stated. The Court adds:
"Though the restoration of just rights to the complainants will be
gradual instead of immediate, it must be continuous and as speedy
as practicable, and must include everything that is essential to an effec-
tive project."'4
It is probable that this litigation has by no means reached its end.
While the taking of testimony by the master is under way, it has be-
come known that the Sanitary District, by reason of what appears to
be official corruption and mismanagement of almost incredible gross-
'U.S. vs. Sanitary District supra.
'Wisconsin et. aL. v. Illinois et. al 73 L.Ed. U.S.S. i95.
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ness, is bankrupt and will have the utmost difficulty in constructing
the sewage disposal plants, and the modern sewer system, which are
necessary and which it has for all these years, with unheard of reck-
lessness, neglected to supply. There is evidence, from the attitude of
officials, hired "experts," and some of the newspapers, to warrant a
suspicion that even now there is no real intention to comply with the
law and the decree of the Court.
If in addition thereto, Congress should, in a perfectly legitimate and
laudable desire to aid in the construction of a waterway to the Missis-
sippi, allow itself to be misled into granting a greater diversion than
is needed for the navigation of such a canal, experts say that i,ooo feet
per second would be ample, the constitutional principles which the
Court did not need to consider for the present will have to be relied
upon for vindicating the rights of the people of the Great Lakes coun-
try.
The fundamental question that would be raised by such a law of
Congress is a novel one in the constitutional theory of the United
States. It is this: Can the federal government deprive one section of
the country of the benefit of natural conditions and confer the advan-
tages derived therefrom upon another? This is a problem of the most
far-reaching character. It has been latent in a variety of forms dur-
ing the recent economic development of this country, and upon its
final solution the whole future of the country may depend. It is by
no means simple, because the same section may be benefitted by some
and injured by others of the applications of whichever solution may
finally be adopted.
If the federal government may, by the withdrawal of large amounts
of water from the Great Lakes, build up commerce and navigation on
the Mississippi, all natural advantages of every city or state, of every
community whatsoever, will, in principle, become dependent on the
will of a majority in Congress, insofar as these advantages can
be affected by the arts of the engineer. To set limits to the expansion
of those arts would be a very bold undertaking. With an economic
incentive, and a sufficient financial support, the engineers are able, now-
adays, literally to move mountains and dry up oceans. The history
of settlement in this country furnishes a very serious precedent for the
disregard of natural conditions. By -building railroads into unseftied
regions, and building up a rate structure for them by which new and
flourishing communities in these undeveloped places were made pos-
sible in practical disregard of distance, we have conquered the con-
tinent and become the most powerful nation in the world. If we had
not overcome by these artificial means the natural disadvantages of the
interior, caused by remoteness from markets, the ,country between
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the Mississippi and the Pacific Coast region would still be a wilder-
ness. A new turn in the economic life has now made it necessary to
make another artificial change, by bringing the ocean ships nearer to
the interior, through an improved waterway up the St. Lawrence. So
far, these measures have worked advantageously; but will they always
do so?
If the waters of a natural hydrographic basin can be diverted to the
benefit of another hydrographic basin, the sections now populous will
lhave a tremendous advantage over the undeveloped portions of the
country, for in their hands will be the decision whether these shall
grow into prosperous commonwealths or not. Already this question
has appeared in connection with the Colorado River, where populous
California is reaching out for water naturally belonging to undevel-
oped Arizona. Evidently the highest kind of far-seeing statesmanship
is needed to solve these problems.
In the case of the Chicago water diversion, it may be that a pro-
tection to the Great Lakes will be found in the historical conditions
that made these waters the boundary between two countries. It is
inconceivable that the United States will attempt to disregard the
rights of Canada to the undiminished flow of the St. Lawrence waters.
Moreover, the manner in which the states of the Great Lakes region
arose suggests a legal protection that may become the basis for a satis-
factory solution of the problem of the rights of localities to their nat-
ural conditions.
The Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787 contains a clause, ac-
cording to which the navigable waters of the Territory and the carry-
ing places between the same, shall be forever free to the inhabitants
of -said Territory as well as other citizens of the United States. By an-
other clause, the Ordinance is made a compact between the govern-
ment and the inhabitants of the Territory. It may be that this should
be construed so that any substantial change in the natural conditions
would at least require the consent of the people of the states carved
out of the Territory.
The question whether the "bill of rights" provisions of the Ordin-
ance are still the law of the land has been decided affirmatively by
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Yet the question may be asked whether,
by being admitted to the United States, on an equality with other states,
the states carved out of the Territory have not abrogated the "com-
pact" of 1787, by common consent, as provided in the instrument it-
self. 5
Economic and social questions in the public life of the United States
6State v. Poone, 84 Ohio St. 346; 95 N.E. Rep. 924.
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have from the beginning had a tendency to assume the form of con-
stitutional, in other words of legal, questions. The highest statesman-
ship in our country has been the statesmanship of trained lawyers.
It is evident that new problems are taking shape which can be solved
only by the skill of legal minds. Therein lies an added incentive for
the young men now preparing for the legal profession, to train them-
selves, profoundly and conscientiously, for these wider tasks as well as
for the ordinary work of lawyers.
